Sigmund Freudâs * view of the self leads to an analogous dualistic view of the self, though the contours and content of his ideas are very different from Kantâs. The obvious problem is that this model of consciousness leaves us with two selves, leading to some disquieting questions: How do these two selves relate to one another? Is one self more primary or fundamental than the other? Which self is our âtrueâ self, our identity, our soul? Are we condemned to be metaphysical schizophrenics? Kant tries mightily to answer these troubling and enigmatic questions, but itâs a very difficult challenge. As a result, Kant identifies another self the empirical self (or ego), which includes all of those particular aspects of our selves that make us uniquely different people: bodies, memories, personalities, ways of thinking, emotional patterns, and so on.

One problem with this view of the self is that there is nothing personal about it.Īs an abstract organizing principle, it appears to be difficult to distinguish one transcendental self from another. This transcendental self (or ego) is not to be found as an entity in consciousnessâit is the dynamic organizing principle that makes consciousness possible. But neither is it hidden from reflective awareness, if we know where to look for it. Of course, Kantâs idea of the self as a âtranscendental unifying principle of consciousnessâ is certainly not âconsciousâ in the traditional sense. Our explorations of the self have, until this point, focused almost exclusively on the conscious self.

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Sigmund freud taboo